INTRODUCTION
Professor Karol Wolfke had devoted a considerable part of his research work to the domain of the sources and codification of international law.
1 The present contribution comes within this field of interest as well, in that it addresses some fundamental, but still unresolved, issues concerning the sources of international law -the mutual relations and interactions between them and the determination of the character of particular norms of international law in the context of their assignment to the appropriate sources.
2 However, it is done by a means of reference to a specific case of norms concerning international responsibility. As the examination of their nature will show, a relationship between different sources may not necessarily be hierarchical or exclusive; it may be just complementary and evolving.
I.
The idea of the responsibility of states for breaches of the law of nations is a relatively old one. 3 The fathers of international law doctrine -among them Grotius, Bynkershoek or Vattel -had written about the monarchs' right to requital for violations of their rights or the rights of their subjects by other states (other sovereigns) and to claim reparation for the consequences of such violations. 4 An early example is given by C.G. Roelofsen who describes a case (mentioned by Grotius) concerning a claim made by the Pomeranian duke Philip II against the Republic of the United Netherlands in protection of the townsmen of Stetinum (Szczecin) who suffered damages from a Dutch caper on service of the Republic.
5 Interestingly, the authors of the oldest works had not even used the term "responsibility", which e.g. was introduced to French language and legal terminology (responsabilité) at the end of eighteenth century and meant "obligation to redress, to make good damage".
6
In the nineteenth century, despite the decline of the law of nature school, the idea of the international responsibility of states was adopted and developed within the positivist doctrine as well as in the practice of claims commissions, which at that time became more and more popular.
7 This resulted in a determination and a certain systematization of the rules concerning responsibility.
While They claimed that a violation of international law entailed neither any legal (enforceable) obligation of reparation, nor any legal relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.
10 Accordingly, it was solely for practical reasons, such as the maintenance of peace and amity, that states cultivated a habit of making good the consequences of a breach, which was to be seen solely as an act of goodwill and specific rehabilitation of the perpetrator. The notion "responsibility" gained in this context a rather instrumental meaning. This approach, however, remained isolated and did not influence further development of the concept of international responsibility.
Actually, according to the opinion prevailing in the doctrine of international law, sovereignty was to be regarded as one of the reasons for the idea of international responsibility. Ch. de Visscher argued that responsibility was a necessary corollary of the sovereignty of states.
11 According to him, responsibility constituted an indispensable element of international law which made the coexistence of sovereign states possible.
12 Even further went M. Huber, who discovered the reason for the idea of responsibility in the very essence of law, in the nature of legal order. As he stated in his report in the British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco case: 13 "Responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All international rights entail international responsibility. Responsibility involves as consequence the obligation to make reparation in case where the obligation had not been performed." 
In the Polish doctrine L. Ehrlich argued in a similar way: "[I]nternational law governs the relations between its subjects, thus responsibility arises when the right of one subject was violated by another." 15 Both approaches, although referring to different notions -the first to sovereignty and the second to the nature of law, actually lead to one conclusion. Responsibility is an inherent element in the international legal order. It constitutes the fundamental principle that determines its "legal" character. However international responsibility may be also defined in another way -as a body of customary norms developed by states, regulating rights and duties which form the contents of these specific legal relations. Therefore, a controversy arose as to the character of responsibility as a legal norm and whether it should be defined as a general principle, fundamental for every legal order (thus international legal order as well) or as institution of customary law. 16
II.
The quality of a general principle in respect of international responsibility was confirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the judgment concerning the Factory at Chorzów Case:
it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation."
18
As a general principle, international responsibility plays a pivotal role in the system of international law: it serves as the guarantee of observance and execution of other norms existing in this legal order. 19 Thus it may be defined as the general sanctioning norm towards all other norms of international law. In that regard, though, it must be born in mind that the characteristics of the international legal order are the equality of all of its subjects and the lack of a single law enforcement mechanism or any superior organ endowed with powers in that 15 "[P]rawo międzynarodowe normuje stosunki między podmiotami tego prawa, odpowiedzialność więc powstaje, jeżeli prawo jednego podmiotu zostało naruszone przez drugi podmiot.", L Ehrlich Prawo międzynarodowe (1958) 638. 16 See G Cottereau (n 6) 7 ff, where the author presents a review of the doctrine (mostly French) in that respect. See also M Schröder 'Verantwortlichkeit, Völkerstrafrecht, Streitbeteiligung und Sanktionen' in W Graf Vitzthum (ed) Völkerrecht (2007) respect to which they all would be subordinated to. 20 Therefore the effectiveness of the principle of responsibility depends on the norms regulating its implementation, which together constitute international responsibility understood as the institution of law.
Notwithstanding the universal acceptance of the principle of international responsibility itself (with the minor exception mentioned above), it took a long time to reach a consensus, in particular amongst international law scholars, as to the contents of norms serving its implementation. 21 The doctrine presented divergent views, frequently in respect of fundamental issues such as the source of responsibility, its premises, the character of obligations and rights rising within the relation of responsibility or the means of execution of these obligations. 22 This diversity is echoed, even nowadays, in the commentaries to the two sets of ILC draft articles concerning international responsibility, including the decision of the Commission to work on the issues of responsibility in respect of states and of international organizations separately, as well as the doctrinal comments and opinions thereon. 23 However, the long-time process of the development of customary norms regulating the matter of responsibility for violations of international law finally resulted in the establishment of a coherent, universal legal regime of international responsibility. 24 It had been formed mainly through the gradual simplification of rules governing the rise and enforcement of responsibility and through purification thereof from the influences of domestic law regulations. In the legal order of equal subjects such as international law, lacking any superior sovereign power over them but the power of a legal norm whose binding force they had recognized, only the regime of responsibility based on principles that are simple, clear and uniform for all subjects. These conditions are met by the customary norms codified in the ILC draft on state responsibility.
25
Responsibility as the basic principle of international law is universal in as much as it concerns all its subjects the same way, regardless of when and how they emerged in the history of this legal order. Therefore, the norms regulating the implementation of international responsibility should likewise be of a universal character. Because of the function of the principle of responsibility for the violation of international law in the international legal order the premises and forms of such responsibility cannot vary whether the violation is committed by a state, or by an international organization, or any other subject of international law. 26 In other words, responsibility must be universal, as is also the institution of international law. Just as the principle of responsibility, the customary norms developed by states as the primary, and in certain historical periods as the only subjects of international law, are a priori binding upon the new subjects or even to whole categories of subjects, such as, in particular, international organizations, in exactly the same way as they would be binding upon newly established states.
27 Such statement is all the more justified when we realise that the norms concerning responsibility regulate, on one hand, the exercise of the essential attributes of international personality. Since the content of international personality is the same in respect of any subject of international law and covers the features which enable their participation in international legal relations, there is no reason for the regulation of the way in that different subjects or types of such subjects (most of all states and international organizations) make use of the attributes of their personality to vary. What may differ is the ratione materiae scope of their competence, but that factor has no impact on the essence of international personality. 28 On the other hand, the norms on international responsibility belong to the special category of "secondary" norms which regulate the functioning of other "primary" norms in a legal order, and therefore their scope and content should be uniform, irrespective of the differences between the subjects of this order. 29 31 , the latter containing regulations mirroring those of the former, 32 as well as by the concurrence, to large extent, of wording of the ILC drafts concerning respectively the responsibility of states and of international organizations.
33

III.
In effect, the dispute over the character of international responsibility seems pointless, for it is actually of a dual nature. As R. Sonnenfeld rightly pointed out, its two aspects are complementary: responsibility as the general principle of international law is implemented by more detailed norms which constitute responsibility as an institution of customary law. 34 Further study would be necessary (and advisable, too) in order to examine whether this conclusion, drawn in respect of international responsibility, is transferable onto other norms of international law.
